From Technology and Compliance to Genuine Business Protection
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An interview with global cybersecurity thought leader and Corix Partners founder JC Gaillard
Global cybersecurity thought leader JC Gaillard discusses his forthcoming book, Cybersecurity Is a Leadership Problem, and why leadership, governance and execution—not buying more security tools—are key to build cybersecurity into a genuine business protection practice.
You are launching a new book this week, Cybersecurity Is a Leadership Problem. Why this book, and why now?
The book is the culmination of a line of thinking that goes back more than a decade, and in many respects considerably longer.
When I started writing regularly about cybersecurity management in 2015, the technology environment was very different. Cloud was still reshaping enterprise IT, ransomware had not reached its current scale, and AI, Zero Trust or post-quantum cryptography were nowhere near the position they occupy in cybersecurity discussions today.
But many of the management problems were already there.
Organisations struggled with accountability, organisational silos, short-termism and execution. CISOs could be held responsible for problems they did not have the authority to resolve. Transformation programmes could identify the right issues without necessarily fixing them.
More than a decade later, we have considerably more technology, regulation, investment and board-level attention. Yet many of those same problems remain.
That is the starting point of the book: Why has cybersecurity changed so much while some of its most fundamental management problems have changed so little?
The title makes a strong statement. Why do you say cybersecurity is a leadership problem?
Because I think we have spent too long treating cybersecurity primarily as a technical problem.
Of course, cybersecurity has a fundamental technical dimension. Organisations need specialist expertise, appropriate controls and technologies capable of protecting increasingly complex environments.
But technology is only one part of the equation.
A security platform cannot resolve organisational politics. A framework cannot create executive accountability. A risk assessment can identify a weakness, but it cannot make management act on it.
The cybersecurity industry has become very good at defining the what: what controls organisations need, what threats they face, what vulnerabilities they should address.
The harder questions have always been the how and the who.
How do you implement and sustain those capabilities across a complex organisation? Who has the authority to make the necessary changes? Who owns them? Who remains accountable when they do not happen?
Those are leadership and management questions.
Does that mean organisations have focused too much on technology?
In many cases, yes, but the issue is not that technology investment is unnecessary.
The problem comes when technology becomes a substitute for addressing deeper structural issues.
Large organisations have invested enormous amounts in cybersecurity. They have built larger teams, acquired sophisticated tools, engaged advisers and launched major transformation programmes.
Yet persistent weaknesses remain.
Money can buy technology, expertise and resources. What it cannot automatically do is establish strategic priorities, create accountability, resolve internal politics or force functions to collaborate.
That leads to one of the propositions I develop in the book: Cybersecurity is often not underfunded as much as it is undermanaged.
The question management should ask is not simply, “How much more should we spend?” It should be, “What sustainable protection capability are we creating from the investment we already make?”
You also revisit the long-running debate about where the CISO should report. Has that debate become a distraction?
It can be.
We have debated for decades whether the CISO should report to the CIO, CEO, COO, CRO or somebody else. If there were a universally correct answer, I think we would have found it by now.
The deeper issue is what the organisation expects the CISO to be.
Is the CISO primarily a technology security leader? An independent control function? A risk executive? A resilience leader? A strategic business protection executive?
Those are very different roles.
Until an organisation is clear about the CISO’s purpose, authority and accountability, changing the reporting line can simply move the ambiguity somewhere else.
The reporting line matters, but it cannot compensate for a poorly defined role, weak governance or a non-existent culture around cybersecurity.
In particular, you challenge the idea of an inherent CIO-CISO conflict. Why?
Because tension and conflict are not the same thing.
CIOs and CISOs have different responsibilities. CIOs need to manage technology delivery, cost, availability, innovation and transformation. CISOs need to challenge weaknesses and ensure that protection and resilience remain adequate.
Those priorities will sometimes collide. That is normal in large organisations.
But moving the CISO away from the CIO does not remove those tensions.
Cybersecurity today is inseparable from architecture, cloud, identity, software development, DevOps, AI, digital transformation and resilience. Any modern CIO should acknowledge that. CIOs and CISOs have to work together regardless of where the reporting lines sit.
The important question is whether governance can resolve legitimate disagreements when priorities compete, whether the CISO can escalate significant concerns and whether accountability sits with executives who actually have the authority to act to resolve those conflicts.
Does that also mean organisations expect too much from their CISOs?
Absolutely, and I think this is becoming a serious problem.
The scope of the CISO role has expanded enormously. CISOs can now be expected to deal with technical security, cyber risk, regulation, third-party risk, cloud, identity, resilience, crisis management, board reporting and increasingly AI-related security and governance.
But the CISO cannot own every activity simply because it has a cybersecurity dimension.
Technology teams need to be accountable for operating technology securely. Business executives need to carry the protection responsibilities associated with the applications and processes they own. Procurement cannot simply transfer accountability for supplier security to the CISO.
The security function should provide expertise, strategic direction, coordination and challenge.
But accountability must follow authority. Otherwise, organisations create CISOs who appear accountable for everything while having authority over relatively little.
Where does compliance fit into this argument?
Compliance has an important role, but it must support protection rather than become the objective.
Regulation, certification and audit can create discipline. They can establish minimum standards and force management attention where internal momentum is insufficient.
But an organisation can be compliant and still carry significant structural weaknesses.
An audit finding can be closed by addressing its material content without necessarily resolving the management problem that created it. A certification can demonstrate that processes exist without proving that those processes will work effectively during a serious incident.
The danger comes when demonstrating activity becomes more important than achieving the underlying protection outcome.
Compliance should support the cybersecurity strategy. It should not become the strategy.
You describe something called the “Cybersecurity Spiral of Failure.” What is it?
It is a pattern I have seen repeatedly.
A serious incident occurs. Executive attention increases. Funding becomes available. Remediation programmes are launched and visible progress is made.
Then the urgency fades. Other priorities return. Longer-term transformation becomes harder to sustain. Structural weaknesses remain unresolved. Eventually another incident occurs and the cycle starts again.
Organisations can spend years moving through that spiral. They can spend substantial amounts of money and make genuine technical improvements while leaving the underlying management conditions unchanged.
That is why short-termism is such an important part of the cybersecurity problem.
Many cybersecurity challenges require sustained action over several years. Management attention frequently operates on a much shorter timescale.
What role should boards play in breaking that cycle?
We need to move the board discussion forward.
For years, CISOs were told that they needed to convince boards that cybersecurity mattered. I think that advice increasingly belongs to an earlier era.
Boards should understand by now that organisations fundamentally dependent on technology require effective cybersecurity and resilience.
The question is what they do about it.
Boards need to challenge whether strategic priorities are clear, whether executive accountability is effective, whether investment is creating sustainable capability and whether long-term transformation is actually progressing.
They also need to understand whether assumptions about resilience have been tested.
The board does not need to manage cybersecurity itself. It needs to ensure that cybersecurity is being managed effectively at executive level.
The subtitle of the book is From Technology and Compliance to Genuine Business Protection. What does “business protection” mean in practice?
It means starting with what the organisation is actually trying to protect rather than starting with technology and tools.
A cyber incident today can interrupt operations, affect customers and suppliers, trigger regulatory action and create substantial financial and reputational consequences.
Cybersecurity, technology resilience and business continuity are increasingly intertwined.
Executive management therefore needs to understand which activities are critical, why they matter, what dependencies support them and how much disruption the organisation can tolerate.
Those considerations should drive cybersecurity strategy, investment, governance and accountability.
That is the shift from managing a security function towards creating a sustainable business protection capability.
Who is the book aimed at?
All business and technology leaders.
The book starts with the CIO because technology leadership remains inseparable from cybersecurity outcomes, and the CISO obviously has a central role because organisations require specialist leadership and credible challenge.
But cybersecurity cannot remain a conversation between the CIO and CISO.
CEOs, executive teams, business leaders and boards all have responsibilities. The challenge is to bring those responsibilities together within a coherent management system.
That is ultimately what the book is about.
If readers take one message from Cybersecurity Is a Leadership Problem, what should it be?
That after decades of technological innovation, escalating threats, increasing investment and expanding regulation, we need to recognise that many of the hardest cybersecurity problems cannot be solved by cybersecurity technology alone.
They concern leadership, accountability, governance, organisational politics, strategic continuity and execution.
Technology will continue to change. AI will transform business practices. Quantum computing may bring another major transformation. New threats, products, regulations and frameworks will emerge.
But the management principles required to create sustainable protection will remain remarkably consistent.
That is the central proposition behind the book:
Cybersecurity is fundamentally a management challenge supported by technology—not a technology challenge that management somehow needs to accommodate.
If organisations can make that shift, cybersecurity stops being simply the CISO’s problem and starts becoming what it should have been all along: a core business protection capability.
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Read more on our Security Transformation Leadership publication here on Medium
